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Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and 
business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments 
negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of 
trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to 
environmental and related issues (e.g. climate change control). What factors 
determine the outcomes of negotiations? What strategies can help reach an 
agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from 
cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? This paper addresses these 
questions by focusing on a Noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is 
particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing 
Noncooperative bargaining theory, Noncooperative coalition theory, and the 
theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connections among 
these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress 
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1  Introduction 
Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. In the arena of social interaction, for example, a 
married couple is almost constantly involved in negotiation processes throughout the 
relationship, from the decision of who will look after the children, to the question of 
whether to buy a house, how to manage the resources of the family and so on. In the 
political arena, a bargaining situation exists, for example, when no single political party 
on its own can form a government, but different parties have to make alliances and 
agree on a common program for them to have the chance of winning. At the 
international level, governments are often engaged in a variety of negotiations on 
matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global 
security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as 
a pollutant’s emissions reduction, water resource management, biodiversity 
conservation, climate change control, etc.). 
What factors determine the outcome of negotiations such as those mentioned 
above? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved 
divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one  make alliances? 
The study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity 
of questions and complex issues. As a consequence, the research literature in this field 
has not yet been able to develop a comprehensive framework for analysis, and a number 
of theories have been proposed instead, each focusing on single aspects of the problem. 
So, for instance, the issue of how to divide the payoffs from cooperation among 
the parties is traditionally addressed within cooperative bargaining theory, which 
makes, in turn, “beneficial” assumptions about which properties the equilibrium 
allocation should have, and does not explicitly address the question of which strategies 
will be adopted by the negotiators.  
In many real life situations, however, cooperation cannot be ensured, and 
binding agreements are not a feasible option. Therefore, the strategic choices of the 
actors involved in the bargaining process need to be explicitly modeled in order to 
determine the final outcome of the negotiation. Noncooperative bargaining theory is 
more concerned with these situations and focuses on the bargaining procedures in the   2
attempt to determine which equilibrium outcome will prevail in the absence of 
interventions. 
When multiple players are involved in the bargaining, there is the possibility that 
coalitions form. Traditional bargaining theory is not suitable for representing such 
situations because it is based on the assumption that only two possible outcomes can 
arise: the fully cooperative outcome and the fully Noncooperative outcome, where 
respectively an agreement among all parties is reached and no agreement forms. 
Noncooperative coalition theory considers this interesting aspect of negotiation 
processes and, without making any assumption on the final result, analyzes the 
incentives that players may have to form coalitions, and how the incentives may affect 
the final outcome of the negotiation. The study of coalition formation is particularly 
important in bargaining contexts where positive externalities are present. In this case, 
due to players’ incentive to free ride, it is quite unlikely that a ‘grand coalition’ will 
form; instead ‘partial agreements’ usually arise. 
Finally, traditional models of negotiation have focused almost exclusively on the 
efficiency properties of both the process and the outcomes. Yet, as every day experience 
indicates, considerations other than efficiency play a crucial role in selecting which 
agreement will be reached – if any at all – and through which path. The theory of fair 
division focuses on processes and strategies that respond not only to Pareto efficiency, 
but also to equity, envy-freeness, and invulnerability to strategic manipulation. 
Although the theoretical literature offers this classification into different 
approaches to the same problem, in the applications the division is not so clear-cut. The 
lack of a unified theoretical framework to address negotiations has meant that the 
various isolated parts of the theory have been of little empirical use. 
While recognizing the importance of cooperative game theory, this paper will 
mainly focus on a Noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly 
relevant for the study of international negotiations. In particular, by reviewing 
Noncooperative bargaining theory, Noncooperative coalition theory and the theory of 
fair division, this survey will try to identify the connections among these different facets 
of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate the progress towards a unified 
framework.   3
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will briefly describe the 
principles of cooperative bargaining theory, which represent the origins of formal 
bargaining theory, and will discuss the links between the cooperative and 
Noncooperative approaches in order to introduce and motivate the study of 
Noncooperative bargaining. Section 3 will analyze in detail the famous alternating-offer 
game proposed by Rubinstein in 1982, which constitutes the starting point for 
Noncooperative bargaining theory. Section 4 will then discuss some important 
extensions of this model.  Section 5 will be devoted to Noncooperative coalition theory, 
with the intent of providing insights into its latest developments, which seek to link the 
theory of coalition formation to the bargaining process. Section 6 will be concerned 
with the theory of fair division. In particular, the questions will be addressed of how 
fairness considerations can alter the results of the standard theoretical models, and how 
fair division algorithms can be incorporated in the existing theories. Finally, some 
concluding comments will be provided in Section 7. 
 
2  Cooperative versus Noncooperative Bargaining Theory 
The formal theory of bargaining originated in the early 1950s with John Nash’s work, 
which establishes the basic framework of the ‘axiomatic (or cooperative) approach’ to 
negotiations. 
Following Nash, a ‘bargaining situation’ can be defined as a situation in which 
(i) individuals (or “players”) have the possibility of concluding a mutually beneficial 
agreement, (ii) there is a conflict of interests about which agreement to conclude, and 
(iii) no agreement may be imposed on any individual without his approval. 
More precisely, Nash defines a ‘bargaining problem’ to be the set of utility pairs 
that can be derived from possible agreements, together with a pair of utilities which is 
designated to be the ‘disagreement point’. This idea can be exemplified with the help of 
a diagram. Figure 1 depicts a bargaining situation in which two players (A and B), 
whose utilities are measured along the x and y-axis respectively, bargain over the 
partition of a single cake of known size. The point denoted (dA, dB) is the point of no 
agreement – and it determines the minimum level of utility each party is ready to accept. 
All points to the northeast of (dA, dB) represent an improvement for both players and,   4
together, they define the negotiation set
1. No agreement above the frontier is feasible, 
and all points on the frontier to the northeast of the no-agreement point are Pareto 
efficient (that is, no player can be made better off without the other player being made 
worse off by moving away from such a point).  
Figure 1: The bargaining problem – zone of agreement conceptualization 
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A ‘bargaining solution’ is a function (or formula) that assigns a single outcome 
to every such problem. The Nash bargaining solution is derived from a number of 
axioms about the properties that it would seem natural for the negotiation outcome to 
have. 
In particular, Nash proposes that a bargaining solution should satisfy the 
following four axioms: 
Ax1:  Scale Invariance, that is, monotone transformation of the utility functions should 
not alter the bargaining solution. 
Ax2:  Symmetry: players are identical, and so they are interchangeable. All differences 
should be taken care of in the definition of the bargaining set and disagreement 
points. 
Ax3: Independence  of  irrelevant alternatives, that is, the exclusion of non-selected 
alternatives from the bargaining set should not alter the bargaining solution. 
                                                 
1 Or zone of agreement, or bargaining set.   5
Ax4:  Pareto efficiency: the solution should be Pareto efficient.  
It turns out that there is precisely one bargaining solution satisfying these four 
axioms, and this solution has a very simple functional form: it selects the utility pair that 
maximizes the product of the players’ gains in utility over the disagreement outcome. 
( )( ) B B A A u u d u d u
B A
− −      max
,  
Having axiomatically identified the equilibrium solution, cooperative bargaining 
theory then concentrates on the problem of how to divide the benefits from agreement 
among the negotiating parties. 
2 
A limit of this approach is that it does not capture the details of the bargaining 
process. In other words, the process required to arrive at the final outcome is left un-
modeled. The justification for this is that rational actors will always choose the outcome 
that maximizes their value. The most efficient solution, therefore, will always be 
realized regardless of the process. 
In fact, as pointed out in the introduction, in many real-life situations 
cooperation cannot be ensured and binding agreements are not a feasible option because 
of the absence of a legitimate authority which can impose a centralized solution and/or 
the complexity of the bargaining situation often involving many parties with very 
different interests. In such contexts, the strategic choices of the actors involved in the 
bargaining process need to be explicitly modeled in order to determine the final 
outcome of the negotiation. 
Noncooperative bargaining theory, which is the focus of this review, is more 
concerned with these situations and analyzes exactly the bargaining procedures, in the 
attempt to find theoretical predictions of what agreement, if any, will be reached by the 
bargainers. In particular, this approach seeks to identify the strategies that may sustain 
cooperation and the variables that may influence agents’ behaviour, such as bargaining 
power, incomplete information, and power relations. In the next two sections, the 
                                                 
2 The research literature on cooperative bargaining theory have proposed different approaches and 
solutions to the basic problem analyzed by Nash. Several extensions have also been developed. See 
Patrone et al. (2004) for a recent survey.     6
fundamentals of Noncooperative bargaining theory and its main extensions will be 
analyzed and discussed in detail. 
 
3  Fundamentals of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory. The Basic 
Rubinstein Alternating-Offer Game 
The seminal paper by Rubinstein (1982) represents the starting point for formal 
Noncooperative bargaining theory. The model developed in this work proposes an 
attractive and intuitive process of bargaining, and provides a basic framework which 
can be adapted to many economic and non-economic situations. Sections 3.1 to 3.3 will 
present and discuss the general structure of the game and its main results, while section 
4 will analyze some important extensions of the model.  
3.1  Structure of the game 
The situation modeled by Rubinstein is the following. There are two players i = 1,2  
who bargain over a single ‘pie’ of size 1. An agreement is defined as a pair (x1, x2), 
where xi is Player i’s share of the pie, and the set of possible agreement is:  
 
{ } . 2 , 1 for     0    and    1 : ) , (                                      2 1
2
2 1 = ≥ = + ∈ = i x x x R x x X i  
 
The players’ preferences over X are diametrically opposed. Each player is 
concerned only about the share of the pie that he receives, and prefers to receive more 
rather than less. That is, for i=1,2 player i prefers    ) , ( 2 1 X x x x ∈ = to  X y y y ∈ = ) , ( 2 1  
if and only if  i i y x > . 
The bargaining procedure is as follows. Players can take actions only at times in 
the (infinite) set  {} 2,.....   1,   , 0 = T . In each period  T t ∈ one of the players, say 1, proposes 
an agreement and the other player (2) either accepts the offer or rejects it. If the offer is 
accepted, then the bargaining ends, and the agreement is implemented. If the proposal is 
rejected, then the play passes to period (t+1), where Player 2 proposes an agreement 
and Player 1 in turn accepts or rejects. The game continues in this way indefinitely until   7
an offer is accepted. At all times, each player knows all his previous moves and all 
those of her opponent, then a complete information scenario is assumed. 
The first two periods of the game are shown in  
Figure 2. Play begins at the top of the tree, and time starts at period 0. Player 1 is 
the first to move and he has a continuum of choices which corresponds to the 
agreements (members of X) he can propose. Each possible proposal leads to a decision 
node for Player 2, at which she accepts (A) or rejects (R) the offer. If Player 2 agrees 
(right-hand branch), then the game ends and the agreement x=(x1, x2) is reached at time 
t=0. If Player 2 rejects the offer (left-hand branch), then play passes to period 1, when it 
is Player 2’s turn to make a proposal. A typical offer of Player 2 is y=(y1, y2); for each 
such offer Player 1 says A(ccept) or R(eject). If he chooses A, the game ends with the 
outcome y at t=1; if he chooses R, then the game continues, Player 1 makes a further 
offer, Player 2 responds, and so on. 
 
Figure 2: The first two periods of the basic Rubinstein’s alternating-offer game 
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 t=1  y 
y=(y1, y2)   8
3.2  Assumptions on players’ preferences 
To complete the description of the game, we need to specify a number of assumptions. 
Rubinstein assumes that each player i=1,2 has a complete transitive reflexive preference 
ordering  i f over the set (X x T) U {D}
3 of outcomes and that the players’ preference 
orderings satisfy the following conditions:  
 
 
A1. (Disagreement is the worst outcome). For every  T X t x x x × ∈ = ) ), , ( ( 2 1  and 
i=1,2, we have  ) , ( D   ) ), , ( ( 2 1 2 1 d d t x x x i = ≥ = . 
A2. (Pie is desirable). For any  X y X x T t ∈ ∈ ∈    ,   ,  and i=1,2 we have 
) ), , ( ( ) ), , ( ( 2 1 2 1 t y y y t x x x i = = f  if and only if  i i y x > . 
A3. ( Time is valuable). For any X x T s T t ∈ ∈ ∈    ,   ,  and i=1,2 we have 
) ), , ( ( ) ), , ( ( 2 1 2 1 s x x x t x x x i = = f  if  s t < (and 0 > i x ). 
A4.  (Continuity). Player i’s preference ordering is continuous. 
A.5. ( Stationarity). For any  X y X x T t ∈ ∈ ∈    ,   , and  i=1,2we have 
)   1    ), , ( (       )    ), , (   ( 2 1 2 1 + = = t y y y t x x x i f  if and only if 
) 1   ), , ( ( ) 0   ), , ( ( 2 1 2 1 y y y x x x i = = f . 
A6. ( Increasing loss to delay). The difference vi(xi)|t=1, where vi(xi)|t=1  is the 
‘present value’ of (xi, t=1) for player i, is an increasing function of xi. 
 
The first assumption concerns the ‘disagreement point’, D, and requires that this 
is the least-preferred outcome for both players. The remaining conditions concern the 
behaviour of preferences on the space X x T. First of all, it is required that among 
agreements reached in the same period, Player i prefers larger value of xi (A2) and 
prefers to obtain any given partition of the cake sooner rather than later (A3). 
Assumption A5 is then introduced in order to simplify the structure of preferences. It 
requires, indeed, that the preferences between (x=(x1,x2), t) and (y=(y1,y2), s) depend 
only on x, y, and the difference s – t. The final condition, A6, states that the loss to delay 
associated with any given amount is an increasing function of the amount.    9
An example of utility function for which conditions A1 through A6 are satisfied 
is the following  
i
t
i i i x t x U δ = ) , ( ,where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ i δ is player i’s discount factor
4. The preferences 
represented by this utility function are traditionally called time preferences with a 
constant discount rate. 
3.3  Main Results 
The Equilibrium of the game 
Rubinstein (1982) proves that every bargaining game of alternating offers in which 
players’ preferences satisfy A1 through A6 has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
(SPE)
5. In correspondence to this equilibrium: 
  Player 1 proposes the agreement x*=(x1
*,  x2
*), defined in equation (2.1) 
below, whenever it is his turn to make an offer, and accepts an offer y=(y1, 
y2) of Player 2 if and only if y1≥ y1
*; 
  Player 2 always proposes y*=(y1
*, y2
*), whenever it is her turn to make an 
offer, and accepts an offer  x=(x1, x2) of Player 1 if and only if x2≥ x2
*. 
The outcome is that Player 1 proposes x
*=(x1
*, x 2
*) in period 0, and Player 2 
immediately accepts this offer. 




*)|t=1   and    x2
*= v2(y2
*)|t=1     (2.1) 
 
where the functions v1(x1
*)|t=1 and v2(y2
*)|t=1 represent respectively the present value of 
(x1
*, t=1) for Player 1 and the present value of (y2
*, t=1) for Player 2. 
In the case of time preferences with constant discount rates (i.e. Player i’s 
preferences over outcomes (x=(x1,x2), t) are represented by the utility function 
i
t
i i i x t x U δ = ) , ( ), (2.1) implies that  y1
*=δ1x1
*  and  x2
*=δ2y2
*, so that 
                                                                                                                                               
3 D represents the disagreement point. 
4 More precisely, we have δi = exp(-ritΔ), where ri is player i’s discount rate and ri > 0. Therefore, if the 
discount rate r decreases, then the discount factor δ increases. This means that player i cares more about 
the future and therefore becomes more patient. 
5 A strategy pair is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of a bargaining game of alternating offers if the 
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It is important to notice that as δ1 approaches 1, the agreement  x *=(x1
*, 
x2
*),approaches (1,0). In other words, as Player 1 becomes more patient, his share 
increases, and, in the limit, he receives all the pie. Similarly, as Player 2 becomes more 
patient, Player 1’s share of the pie approaches zero. 
 
Properties of the equilibrium solution 
The equilibrium outcome defined above displays some important properties: 
 
P1. (Uniqueness). The SPE of the game is unique, which means that the game 
has a determined solution. 
P2. (No delay). Whilst the structure of the bargaining game allows negotiation to 
continue indefinitely, in the unique SPE agreement is reached at time t=0. 
P3. (Efficiency). From an economic point of view, the fact that negotiation ends 
immediately implies that the equilibrium is efficient, in the sense that no 
resources are lost in delay. 
P4. (Patience). The model predicts that when a player’s discount factor 
increases, which means that he/she becomes more patient
6, his/her negotiated 
share of the pie increases. Thus, the bargaining power depends on players’ 
relative degree of impatience. 
P5. (A-symmetry). The structure of the alternating-offer bargaining game 
proposed by Rubinstein is asymmetric in one respect: one of the bargainers is the 
first to make an offer. This results in an advantage for the first mover who 
obtains, in the unique SPE, more than half of the pie. The asymmetry in the 
structure of the game is, however, artificial and its effects can be diminished by   11
reducing the amount of time that elapses between periods. Rubinstein proves 
that, in the limiting case (i.e. when the length of the periods shrinks to 0), the 
amount received by a player is the same regardless of which player makes the 
first offer. The unique SPE then approximates the (symmetric) Nash bargaining 
solution. 
 
4  Extensions of the Standard Noncooperative Bargaining Model 
4.1  Multiple Players 
Starting from the basic Rubinstein alternating-offer game described in the previous 
section, most of the literature on Noncooperative bargaining theory has been devoted to 
models of two players. In many real-life situations, however, bargaining processes 
involve a large number of individuals or interest groups. In such a case, the prediction 
of the standard model that a unique equilibrium exists where agreement is reached 
immediately, does not usually hold. This section will discuss how the standard results 
change in a multilateral negotiation context, which problems may arise and what 
solutions have been proposed in the literature. 
To simplify the discussion we consider a situation in which three players 
negotiate on the partition of a cake of size 1. There are, in fact, many ways of extending 
the Rubinstein two-players alternating-offer game to this case. An extension that 
appears to be quite natural is the one suggested and analyzed by Shaked (1986). 
Shaked’s game is the following. In the first period, Player 1 proposes a partition x=(x1, 
x2 , x3), with x1+x2+x3=1 and Players 2 and 3 in turn accept or reject this proposal. If 
either of them rejects it, then play passes to the next period, in which it is Player 2’s turn 
to propose a partition and Players 3 and 1 respond sequentially. If at least one of them 
rejects the proposal, then again play passes to the next period, in which Player 3 makes 
an offer and Players 1 and 2 respond. Players rotate in this way until a proposal is 
accepted by all responders. Players’ preferences are represented by the utility function ui 
= δ 
t-1xi (where 0≤δ≤1 is the common discount factor) and thus satisfy the assumptions 
                                                                                                                                               
6 See footnote 3.   12
A1 through A6 of the basic Rubinstein’s game. Moreover, there are no exogenously 
imposed limits on the duration of the game, but the absence of agreement (that is 
bargaining forever) leads to a payoff of 0 for all players. 
This model, of course, reduces to the standard alternating-offer game when there 
are exactly two players. Unfortunately, however, for n≥3 the game admits many 
equilibrium outcomes. In particular, it has been proved that: every allocation of the cake 
can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if players are sufficiently 
patient (δ >1/2) and outcomes with delay are also possible equilibria. Changing the 
order of moves, the simultaneity of responses, etc., does not alter this conclusion. 
The indeterminacy of the three (or n) player game has aroused much interest 
among researchers, and various solutions have been proposed to isolate a unique 
equilibrium outcome. Some authors, for example, suggested the adoption of different 
(more refined) equilibrium concepts, while others to modify the structure of the game. 
Remaining in the context of the original unanimity model introduced by Shaked, 
it has been noticed that the only subgame perfect equilibrium in which players’ 
strategies are stationary has a form similar to the unique SPE of the two-player game. In 
particular, Herrero (1985) showed that if players have time preferences with a common 
























which tends to the equal split as δ tends to 1.  
The notion of stationary SPE may therefore be used to restore the uniqueness of 
the equilibrium in multilateral bargaining situations. However, the restriction to 
stationary strategies is quite strong. Such strategy prescribes actions in every period that 
do not depend on time, or on events in previous periods. Thus, for example, a stationary 
strategy in which Player 1 always makes the proposal (1/2, 1/2) means that even after 
Player 1 has made the offer (3/4, 1/4) for a thousand times, Player 2 still believes that 
Player 1 will make the offer (1/2, 1/2) in the next period, which is quite unrealistic. 
A more appealing way to solve the problem of indeterminacy of the n-player 
game is to modify the structure of the game. For example, Jun (1987) and Chae and 
Yang (1988, 1994) consider procedures where players are engaged in a series of   13
bilateral negotiations and any player that reaches a satisfactory agreement may “exit” 
the game. A more interesting approach is suggested by Krishna and Serrano (1996), 
where players still have the possibility to exit, i.e. to leave with their share before the 
entire bargaining process is completed, but, unlike Jun/Chae and Yang’s mechanisms, 
the offers are made to all players simultaneously and thus the bargaining is multilateral. 
In particular, the structure of the game is as follows. There are three players 
bargaining on the partition of a ‘pie’ of size one. In the first period, Player 1 proposes a 
division x=(x1, x2 , x3) and  in response of such proposal the following situations can 
occur: (a) Both Players 2 and 3 accept the offer. In this case, the game ends with that 
division. (b) Both players reject the offer and the game passes to the next period where 
Player 2 makes an offer and Players 3 and 1 must respond. (c) One of the responders, 
say Player 3, accepts the offer x while the other (Player 2) rejects. In this case, 3 can 
“exit” the game with an amount x3 while players 1 and 2 are left to bargain over the 
division of 1 – x3  in period 2. The bargaining now proceeds as in the two player 
alternating offer game with player 2 proposing some partition of 1 – x3 . In this model, 
then, the person making offer receives a payoff if and only if all the other players accept 
her offer, but a responder who is satisfied with her share, can simply ‘take the money 
and run away’, with no need for unanimous consensus as required in Shaked’s game. 
With the introduction of such procedure, the authors are able to identify a unique perfect 
equilibrium, for any number of players. Moreover, for all n, the unique equilibrium is 
characterized exactly as in the case of two players and the equilibrium agreement 
approximates the n-player Nash bargaining solution when players are patient. 
In our discussion of multilateral bargaining situations we have deliberately 
omitted an important element that may appear in negotiation contexts with 3 or more 
players, that is the possibility for players to form coalitions. This element makes the 
modelling of such situations even more difficult because one should not only determine 
what each player gets individually, but also which coalition will or will not form. The 
study of coalition formation becomes particularly important when we consider 
negotiations over public goods, such as many international environmental negotiations. 
In this case, the presence of externalities may induce players to free ride on the 
negotiating agreement in order to enjoy the benefits from cooperation without paying   14
any cost. These and other problems will be discussed in Section 4 which is entirely 
devoted to coalition theory.  
4.2  Multiple Issues 
Many real-life negotiations (such as trade or environmental negotiations) do not only 
involve a large number of individuals, but also a set of different issues. By contrast, 
most of the existing literature focuses on the problem of dividing a ‘single-pie’ between 
two agents. In this section, we will first discuss when the insights from the classical 
theory still apply to the multiple-issue case, and we will then consider other important 
elements that may emerge when players negotiate over more than one project. 
In general, we can distinguish two different ways of handling multiple-issue 
negotiations. The first one is to bundle all the issues and discuss them simultaneously 
(complete package approach
7); the second one is to negotiate the issues one by one 
(sequential approach). Suppose, for example, that there are two players, 1 and 2, 
negotiating, via an offer-counteroffer bargaining procedure, over two different projects, 
X and Y. According to the first approach, an offer is a pair (x, y) specifying a division on 
both issues, and players make offers and counteroffers of (x, y) until an agreement is 
reached. On the contrary, the second approach involves a sequential determination of 
allocations for the two projects. For example, players may start making offers and 
counteroffers on x only, until agreement. Once an agreement is reached, the allocation is 
implemented and bargaining proceeds over y. Intuitively, when the first approach is 
adopted, that is all issues are bargained simultaneously and allocations are implemented 
only after agreement has been reached on the whole package, then even complex 
negotiations reduce to “as if” single-pie bargaining and the classical theory applies 
directly. This conclusion is not obvious anymore when bargaining or agreement 
implementation take place according to the second approach, that is in a sequential way. 
In such a case, the order in which problems are discussed may assume a strategic role 
and affect the final outcome of the negotiation (in the example described above, players 
could start negotiating on y instead of x and thus obtain a different result). 
                                                 
7 In other literatures, this is known as ‘issue linkage’. The basic idea behind this mechanism is to design a 
negotiation framework in which players do not negotiated only on one issue, but force themselves to 
bargain on two or more issues jointly.   15
In multiple-issue negotiations, the timing of projects on the bargaining table is 
specified by a negotiation agenda, which can be defined exogenously, i.e. before 
negotiation begins, or endogenously, i.e. during the bargaining process. 
In general, players may have different preferences over different agendas. In the 
initial example, for instance, player 1 may prefer the agenda XY to the agenda YX, while 
player 2 may prefer YX to XY. This is because: a) Players may have different time 
constraints for reaching agreements on the two issues, that is each player may have its 
own deadline for each issue; b) Players may differ for their attitude toward time, i.e. for 
their discount factors. One player may, for instance, gain utility with time and have an 
incentive to reach a late agreement (patient player), while the other may lose utility with 
time and try to reach an early agreement (impatient player). In an ‘issue-by-issue’ 
bargaining process, this disposition of negotiators may strongly influence strategic 
behaviors and, therefore, the negotiation outcome. 
In the past decades, the study of the role of the negotiation agenda has obtained 
increasing attention among researchers and various interesting contributions have been 
proposed in the literature. Fershtman (1990), for example, considers a situation in which 
two players with time preferences and additively separable utility functions negotiate, 
according to an alternating offer procedure, over two linear issues. In this model, the 
agenda is defined exogenously and both players are assumed to have identical discount 
factors and no deadlines. The author analyzes sequential agendas where the realization 
of utilities is postponed until both projects are accepted (simultaneous implementation). 
He shows that a player prefers the first project be least important to him but most 
important to the opponent. However, as players become increasingly patient, the impact 
of the agenda disappears. In and Serrano (2003) develop a model to investigate exactly 
the effects of agenda restrictions on the properties of the equilibrium outcome. What is 
found is that when the agenda is very restricted (such as, for example, when bargainers 
are forced to negotiate only one issue at a time, the one chosen by the proposer at each 
round), multiple equilibria and delay in agreement do usually arise. 
In a similar setting with two linear issues and two players, Busch and Horstmann 
(1997) partially ‘endogenize’ the bargaining agenda by introducing a separate 
bargaining round over it. The order in which issues are negotiated becomes, however,   16
truly endogenous in Inderst (2000), where players bargain over projects without any ex-
ante agreed agenda. 
In this model issues are either mutually beneficial or strictly controversial and 
each subset of projects is immediately implemented after partial agreement on this set 
(sequential implementation). The author first derives the equilibrium payoffs when an 
exogenously given agenda requires that bargaining proceeds simultaneously or 
sequentially over the set of projects. The analysis reveals that the agenda can have a 
marked impact on payoffs and – in contrast to the result reported by Fershtman (1990) – 
this impact does not seem to vanish as players become increasingly patient. In 
particular, bargaining simultaneously over a set of projects can improve efficiency by 
creating trading opportunities across issues
8. Moreover, changing the agenda may have 
a distributive effect, and players may therefore prefer different agendas. In the second 
part of the paper the author then identifies which agenda is chosen endogenously. The 
results of the analysis can be summarized as follows: A) when issues are mutually 
beneficial, then players choose to bargain simultaneously over all issues. However, if 
the bargaining set contains B) strictly controversial projects two different sub-cases 
need to be distinguished depending on whether or not randomization devise is an 
available option: (B1) if players have access to a randomization device, an analogous 
result holds as in the previous case; (B2) with strictly controversial projects and without 
lotteries there might be multiple equilibria involving even considerable delay.  
                                                 
8 The profitability and effectiveness of linkage strategies have been largely studied, especially in the 
literature on coalition formation. Pioneering contributions are those by Tollison and Willett (1979) and 
Sebenius (1983), who proposed linkage mechanisms to promote cooperation on a number of matters, such 
as security and international finance. Issue linkage was formally introduced into the economic literature 
on international environmental cooperation by Folmer et al. (1993) and by Cesar and De Zeeuw (1996) to 
solve the problem of asymmetries among countries. The intuition is that, if some countries gain from 
cooperating on a given issue whereas other countries gain from cooperating on another one, by linking the 
two issues it may be possible to obtain an agreement which is profitable to all countries. Linkage 
strategies can also be used to mitigate the problem of free-riding which normally affect negotiations over 
public goods, such as environmental quality. This aspect has been addressed in various ways. For 
instance, Barrett (1995, 1997), proposes linking environmental protection to negotiations on trade 
liberalisation. In this way, potential free-riders are deterred with threats of trade sanctions. Other 
interesting contributions are those by Carraro and Siniscalco (1995, 1997), and Katsoulacos (1997), 
where environmental cooperation is linked to cooperation in R&D. In a more recent work, Alesina et al. 
(2001) further analyze the problem of the effectiveness of linkage mechanisms in increasing cooperation, 
and identify an interesting trade-off between the size and the scope of a coalition: a coalition where 
players cooperate on too many issues may be formed by a few players, which implies small spillovers 
among them, whereas coalitions in which cooperation is restricted to few issues may be joined by many 
players, thus raising many positive externalities within the coalition.   17
Bac and Raff (1996) focus on the effect of incomplete information about 
bargaining strength on the choice of the bargaining procedure. The model involves two 
players negotiating in a Rubinstein fashion over two pies, each of size one. The price-
surplus is known to agents and for both players the discount factor is assumed to be 
equal over all issues. However, agents have asymmetric information about discounting 
factors. One player is perfectly informed, while the other is uncertain about his 
opponent’s discounting factor. In particular, this can take one of the two values, δH with 
probability π, and δL with probability (1- π). This bargaining game has a sequential 
equilibrium with rationalizing beliefs such that, while a weak (impatient) player prefers 
to negotiate simultaneously over the two pies, a strong (patient) player may make an 
offer on just one pie in order to signal bargaining strength. The uniformed player always 
makes a combined offer on the two pies, which may include screening the informed 
player and thus causing delay. According to this result, issue-by-issue negotiations may 
thus arise from signaling considerations. 
More recently, Fatima et al. (2003) studied the strategic behavior of agents by 
using an agenda that is partly exogenous and partly endogenous. This is done by 
decomposing the N issues into k equal stages. The issues for each stage are determined 
exogenously, while the order in which issues are settled at each stage is determined 
endogenously. The analysis shows that the negotiation outcome changes with the value 
of k and that the optimal number of decompositions for an agent depends on the 
negotiation parameters. In some negotiation scenarios the optimal value of k differs for 
the two agents, while in others it is identical. In other words, there exist negotiation 
scenarios where the utility to both agents can be improved by negotiating in stages 
compared to the utilities they get from single-stage negotiations.  
This result complements the explanations provided by the previous works, 
namely that differing preferences over issues play an important role in determining 
negotiation agendas. Exploring the agents’ strategic behavior by separating negotiation 
over the agenda from negotiation over the issues can be another promising line of 
research.   18
4.3  Incomplete Information  
Information can be defined as the knowledge about all factors that affect the ability of 
an individual to make choices in any given situation. For example, in bargaining 
between a buyer and a seller, information includes what an agent knows about its own 
parameters (like his reservation price or his preferences over possible outcomes) and 
what he knows about his opponent’s parameters. 
A critical assumption of the Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offer game is that 
each player has complete information about the other’s preferences. This assumption is 
quite limiting because in real bargaining there are always some parameters agents are 
uncertain about. 
When incomplete information exists, new elements appear: a player, for 
instance, may try to conclude from the other player’s moves, who his opponents really 
is; the other player, in turn, may try to bluff that he is tougher than he actually is, and so 
on. 
An important distinction in the ambit of incomplete information models is that 
between symmetric and asymmetric information. Consider, for example, a game with 
two players. The symmetric case corresponds to the situation in which both players lack 
information about the opponent’s parameters; in the asymmetric case, on the contrary, 
uncertainty affects just one of the agents. 
Following Harsanyi and Selten (1972), models of games with incomplete 
information usually proceed by adopting the assumption that each player starts with the 
same probability distribution on other players’ private information and that these priors 
are common knowledge. This is modeled by having the game begin with a probability 
distribution, known to all players. Thus, agents not only have priors over other players’ 
private information, they also know what priors the other players have over their own 
private information.  
Starting from this idea, Rubinstein (1985) proposes an extension of his original 
model to handle information uncertainty. This is a two person infinite horizon game that 
considers incomplete information over agents’ discounting factors. One of the players, 
say player 2, may be one of two types: weak (for high discounting factor) and strong 
(for low discounting factor). Player 1 adopts an initial belief about the identity of player 
2. Player 1’s preference is known to player 2. Agreement is reached in the first or   19
second time period. The main result of the work is the existence of a unique sequential 
equilibrium when player 1’s belief that player 2 is of type weak is higher than a certain 
threshold, and another unique equilibrium when this belief is lower than the threshold. 
Within a similar framework, Fundenberg and Tirole (1983, 1985) analyze a 
buyer-seller infinite horizon bargaining game in which reservation prices are uncertain, 
but time preferences are known. In particular, they focus on whether or not the 
bargaining outcome can be ex-post efficient in the presence of one-sided and two-sided 
uncertainty. When exactly one player’s reservation value is her private information 
(asymmetric case), the efficiency of the bargaining outcome depends on whether or not 
the players’ reservation values are independent of each other. If the players’ reservation 
values are independent, then the bargaining outcome can be ex-post efficient. If they 
are, instead, correlated the bargaining outcome will not be efficient. When each player’s 
reservation value is her private information (symmetric case), the bargaining outcome 
cannot be ex-post efficient whether or not the players’ reservation values are 
independent of each other. 
Uncertainty over agent deadlines has been studied by Sandholm and Vulkan 
(1999) in a symmetric information scenario. Since each player’s deadline is private 
information, there is a disadvantage in making offers. Any offer reveals some 
information about the proposer’s deadline, namely that it cannot be very long. If it were, 
the proposer would stand a good chance of being able to out-wait the opponent, and 
therefore would ask for a bigger portion of the surplus than it did. Similarly, the offerer 
knows that it offered too much if the offer gets accepted: the offerer could have done 
better by out-waiting the opponent. The main result of this work is that there exists a 
sequential equilibrium where agents do not agree to a split until the first deadline, at 
which time the agent with the later deadline receives the whole surplus. This result 
holds both for pure and mixed strategies and, in most cases, is not affected by time 
discounting and risk aversion.  
In a more recent work, Fatima et al. (2002) address uncertainty over two 
parameters: deadlines and reservation prices. In contrast with the previous models, 
however, they assume that the probability distribution over these factors is private 
knowledge for each player. As in Sandholm and Vulkan (1999), the optimal strategies   20
give the entire surplus of price to the agent with the longer deadline. However, time 
discounting is not neutral anymore, but affects agents’ payoffs. 
To conclude, it is worth mentioning a model proposed by Petrakis and 
Xepapadeas (1996) to study the problem of international environmental cooperation 
under moral hazard. This work is more related to the literature on coalition formation, 
but can provide interesting insights for the analysis and comprehension of bargaining 
processes in the presence of information uncertainty. The set of players consists of the 
following two groups of countries: environmentally conscious countries (ENCCs) and 
less environmentally conscious countries (LENCCs). The authors analyze the 
conditions under which the two groups can form a stable coalition to adjust emissions 
so that a first-best global welfare optimum is achieved
9. 
The interesting aspect of the model is that asymmetries in information among 
countries are considered, in the sense that countries entering into agreements know their 
own emissions but cannot observe the emissions of the other participating countries. 
This may create problems in the enforcement of the agreement, since countries have an 
incentive to cheat by emitting more than the agreement stipulates. A mechanism that 
detects cheating is developed by the authors in order to induce the desired emissions 
even when the emission level of an individual country cannot be observed by the rest of 
the participating countries. 
From this brief review, it seems clear that the presence of uncertainty in 
information may have a strong impact on the negotiation outcome and may provide an 
appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. Informational differences may also 
explain the presence of bargaining power among agents and may have different effects 
on the negotiation outcome when players are characterized by different degrees of risk 
aversion. 
4.4  Bargaining in stochastic environments 
As discussed in the previous section, incomplete information refers to uncertainty over 
players’ parameters, such as players’ discount factors, deadlines or reservation prices. 
However, there are many other forms of uncertainty which may affect a bargaining 
                                                 
9 In particular, a self-financing side payment scheme is determined, capable of securing a stable partial 
coalition of ENCCs with a subset of LENCCs.   21
process. For example, the size of the ‘pie’ over which agents are negotiating may vary 
stochastically, as well as the disagreement point. These sources of uncertainty concern 
the environment in which negotiations take place.  
The theoretical literature on strategic bargaining in stochastic environment is 
still quite limited, as well as its applications to existing data. In the last decade, 
however, this issue has attracted increasing attention among researchers and various 
efforts have been made in this direction.  
In particular, Merlo and Wilson (1995) have proposed an extension of the basic 
Rubinstein two-player alternating-offer game to a K-player bargaining model with 
complete information, where both the identity of the proposer and the size of the pie 
follow a stochastic process
10.  
In each period, a state is realized which determines the cake (i.e., the set of 
possible utility vectors to be agreed upon in that period) and the order in which players 
move. The selected player may either propose an allocation or pass. If he proposes an 
allocation, each of the remaining players in turn accepts or rejects the proposal. If any 
player rejects the proposal, a new state is realized and the process is repeated until some 
proposed allocation is unanimously accepted. 
More formally, the model can be described as follows. Let K= {1,..., K} denote 
the set of players involved in the bargaining process and let S={s0,..., st} denote the set 
of possible states of the world. A stochastic sequential bargaining game for K may be 
indexed by (C, ρ, β), where for each state  S s∈ , C(s) is a cake representing the set of 
feasible utility vectors that may be agreed upon in that state, ρi(s) denotes the identity of 
the player who makes the ith move in that state, and β is the common discount factor for 
the players. 
The game is played as follows. Upon the realization of a state s, ρ1(s) (the player 
who makes the first move in state s) chooses to either pass or propose an allocation in 
C(s). If he proposes an allocation, player ρ2(s) responds by either accepting or rejecting 
the proposal and after him, all the other players respond in the order prescribed by ρ(s). 
If the proposal is not unanimously accepted, but some players reject it, then the game 
                                                 
10 More specifically, both random parameters follow a general Markov process, which is formally defined 
as a discrete process in which the probabilities of transitions from one state to another are fixed and 
independent of time – that is, the system at time t+1 depends only on the system at time t, and not on the 
state at any earlier time.    22
moves to the next period where a new state s’ is realized according to a Markov process 
σ=(σ0, σ1, σ2,…), defined in the space S. This procedure is then repeated except that the 
order of moves is determined by ρ(s’) and the proposal must lie in the set C(s’). The 
process continues until an allocation is proposed and accepted by all players. 
An outcome of this bargaining game is either a pair (η, τ) – where τ denotes the 
period in which a proposal is accepted and η denotes the proposed allocation which is 
accepted in state s – or disagreement. Then, for the game starting in state s, an outcome 
(η, τ) implies a von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff to party i, E[β
τηi/ σ0=s]. 
In order to solve the game, the authors focus on stationary sub-game perfect 
outcomes and payoffs, that is, on outcomes and payoffs generated by a stationary sub-
game perfect strategy profile. The reason for this choice is that, when there are more 
than two players, the game does not usually admit a unique equilibrium outcome but 
multiple equilibria, even in the absence of uncertainty. As discussed in section 4.1, 
stationary is the solution concept which is typically adopted in multilateral bargaining 
models in order to solve the problem of indeterminacy of the negotiation outcome. 
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows:  
R1: There exist a unique (stationary sub-game perfect) equilibrium; 
R2: The equilibrium is efficient, even though it may involve delays. 
This result is not exactly conforming to what the standard literature predicts. In 
particular, according to the traditional models of bargaining, when an equilibrium 
exists, either it is efficient and such that agreement is reached immediately (as in the 
basic Rubinstein two-player game), or outcomes with delay may arise but efficiency is 
not guaranteed anymore. 
In the standard theory, the most common explanation for delaying agreement is 
that players are unsure about the true preferences of their opponents. In other words, 
incompleteness in information (see section 4.3) can cause inefficient equilibrium 
outcomes. In the context of complete information, sequential bargaining models 
generally admit delays only if there are multiple equilibria.  
On the contrary, in the stochastic model by Merlo and Wilson, which is a model 
with complete information, agreement may be delayed even in the unique stationary 
sub-game perfect equilibrium and the equilibrium is still efficient.   23
The intuition for this result is that, when the future size of the cake is random, 
there can be potential benefits to waiting as the size of the cake may grow in the future. 
In other words, delay is caused by the expectation that the total bargaining value may 
rise in the future and hence is efficient from the point of view of the negotiating parties. 
Various applications exist of the framework described above, which mainly 
focus on the problem of government formation. Merlo (1997), for instance, investigates 
the process of government formation in post-war Italy, while Diermeier et al. (2004) 
explore the role of bicameralism in determining government durability. 
These studies seem to confirm the efficiency of delays predicted by Merlo and 
Wilson for bargaining in stochastic environments. From a theoretical point of view, 
however, this result depends also on other features of the game, such as the agreement 
rule which is adopted, or the bargaining procedure. For example, when the agreement 
rule is a general q-quota rule as in Eraslan and Merlo (2002) , uniqueness and efficiency 
of the equilibrium are not guaranteed anymore. On the other hand, when players are 
given the possibility to delay making offer, as in Furasawa and Wen (2001), the game 
still has a unique equilibrium solution, but outcomes with delay are not efficient. 
To conclude, it is important to notice that all the models mentioned above are 
static models of bargaining, while the problem of negotiating over a pie of not-fixed 
size could be better seen as a dynamic problem, where the state of the system evolves in 
time. In Noncooperative bargaining theory, the dynamic nature of negotiations is 
normally represented trough repeated bargaining games, which are described in the 
following section. Further research is therefore needed in order to understand what are 
the links between stochastic and dynamic nature of the bargaining setting, and how this 
can be modeled. 
4.5  Repeated Bargaining Situations 
An implicit assumption of the Rubinstein’s (1982) bargaining model is that players’ 
interaction ceases after a decision is reached, in other words, once the negotiation 
process ends, players do not meet anymore. In fact, this is rarely the case in real settings 
because agents usually have the opportunity to be involved in a sequence of bargaining 
situations. Think, for example, of two adjacent countries and of the vast occasions of   24
bargaining they may have over time: from trade to international protection, from 
political questions to environmental problems… 
This section will focus on repeated bargaining games, which have been 
proposed in the literature in the attempt to represent the long-term relationships that 
may exist among bargainers. In a repeated framework, a game is played in successive 
stages and at each stage players can decide on the basis of the actions and the outcomes 
of the previous stages. There is an accumulation of information about the ‘history’ of 
the game that may affect players’ strategic choices. In particular, even if it is the ‘same 
game’ which is repeated over a number of periods, the global ‘repeated game’ becomes 
a fully dynamic system with a much more complex structure than the one-stage game. 
We will analyze here a simple repeated bargaining situation in which two 
players sequentially bargain over the partition of an infinite number of cakes. The model 
is based upon Muthoo (1995) and consists in an infinite repetition of the standard 
Rubinstein model. Despite its simplicity, it provides some interesting results and allows 
us to lay down the basic structure of repeated bargaining situations. The first important 
qualification of the game is that players start bargaining over the partition of the (n+1)th 
cake (where n=1, 2,…) if and only if they reach agreement on the partition of the nth. 
The second qualification is that the time at which the players start bargaining over the 
partition of the (n+1)th cake is determined by the time at which agreement is struck over 
the partition of the nth cake. The structure of the game is as follows: there are two 
agents A and B, who bargain over the partition of a cake of size π (π >0), according to 
an alternating-offer procedure. If agreement is reached at time t1, then immediately the 
players consume their respective (agreed) shares. Then τ (τ >0) time units later, at time 
t2= t1+ τ, the players bargain over the partition of a second cake of size π. Agreement at 
time t2 is followed immediately with players consuming their agreed shares. This 
process continues indefinitely (t3, t4,…), provided that players always reach agreement. 
However, if players perpetually disagree over the partition of some cakes, then there is 
no further bargaining over new cakes: agents have simply terminated their relationship. 
In this model, the payoffs to the players depend on the number N of cakes that 
they partition. In particular, if N=0 – that is they perpetually disagree over the division 
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This game has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and in 
equilibrium agreement is reached immediately over the partition of each and every cake. 
In general, however, this equilibrium outcome is different from the unique SPE partition 
of the single available cake in Rubinstein’s model. The intuition for this difference is as 
follows: in a repeated bargaining model a player’s discount factor determines not only 
her cost of rejecting an offer, but also her value of future bargaining situations. Suppose 
that player i becomes more patient (that is her discount rate ri decreases and her 
discount factor δi increases). This means that her cost of rejecting an offer decreases. 
However, it also means that her value of future bargaining situations increases. When 
bargaining over the partition of a cake, the former effect increases her bargaining power 
(as she is more willing to reject offers), but the latter effect decreases her bargaining 
power because she is more willing to accept offers so that the players can proceed to 
bargain over the partition of the next cake. It has been shown that, under some plausible 
conditions, the latter effect tends to dominate the former effect. This result implies that 
when a player becomes less patient, she receives a greater share of each and every cake. 
Thus, the impact of players’ discount rates in repeated bargaining situations may differ 
fundamentally from that in one-shot bargaining situations. 
4.6  Synthesis of the results 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis conducted in sections 2 and 3. In 
particular, three main characteristics of the equilibrium outcome are considered for the 
basic Rubinstein alternating-offer game and its extensions: (i) the determinacy of the 
equilibrium, (ii) the timing of the agreement and (iii) the efficiency of the result. 
As previously noted, the model proposed by Rubinstein involves only two 
players bargaining over the division of a single ‘pie’ in a complete information setting. 
Under these conditions, the alternating-offer bargaining game admits a unique SPE. In   26
such equilibrium, the agreement is reached immediately and the bargaining process is 
efficient, in the sense that no resources are lost in delay.  
Table 1: Characteristics of the equilibrium outcome in the basic Rubinstein model  
and in the extensions analyzed through section 3. 
   
Determinacy of the 
equilibrium 
 
Timing of the 
agreement 
 























A) Mutually beneficial 
issues 
 
B) Strictly controversial 
issues: 
 
B1) possibility of 
randomising 
 


















































Presence of delay 
 
Not always guaranteed 
Bargaining in a 
stochastic environment 
(uncertainty about the 
size of the pie and/or the 
order of moves) 














































The equilibrium is 















Not always guaranteed 
*In general, however, this equilibrium outcome is different from the unique SPE of the basic Rubinstein’s 
model because of the different impact that players’ discount rates usually have in repeated bargaining 
situations. In particular, in the standard model, as a player becomes more patient, her share of the pie 
increases, while the opposite happens in repeated bargaining games (see section 3.4.).  
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To which features of the model can we attribute this result? As shown in Table 
1, one possible explanation for delaying agreement is that players are unsure about the 
true preferences of their opponents. In other words, incompleteness in information can 
cause inefficient equilibrium outcomes. 
In a complete information setting, the presence of delay is closely related to the 
existence of multiple equilibria, which may arise, for instance, when the negotiation 
process involves more than two players. However, if the negotiation takes place in a 
stochastic environment (such as, for example, when the size of the pie over which 
players bargain varies stochastically) agreement may be delayed even in the unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium and the equilibrium may still be efficient
11. 
 
5  Noncooperative Coalition Theory 
As noticed in Section 4.1, many real negotiations involve a large number of parties or 
interest groups. When modelling these situations, the standard bargaining theory (both 
cooperative and Noncooperative) makes the implicit assumption that there are just two 
possible outcomes of the bargaining process: the cooperative outcome, where an 
agreement is reached among all players involved in the negotiation process, and the 
Noncooperative outcome, where no agreement forms. This dichotomy is often not 
representative of real-life situations where partial agreements can form among a subset 
of players. 
In this section, we will focus on a different approach to multilateral negotiations, 
which is ‘Noncooperative Coalition Theory’ (NCT). Unlike standard bargaining theory, 
this approach is able to take into account these intermediate cases because it allows for 
the possibility of sub-coalitions to form. 
More in general, we can distinguish both a cooperative and a Noncooperative 
perspective within the theory of coalitions. However, as we will see in section 4.1, 
cooperative coalition theory (CCT) basically coincides with the standard cooperative 
                                                 
11 Another important element that may affect the timing of the solution is the presence of option values, 
which do normally arise in dynamic contexts, that is when the state of the system evolves in time. This 
aspect has been widely studied in optimal control theory, while research is still needed in the ambit of 
non-cooperative game theory.   28
bargaining theory (Nash, 1950) for the case of N players and it cannot really help in 
understanding the forces which drive the formation of (partial) coalitions.  
As shown in some recent works by Gomes and Bloch, another reason to 
concentrate on NCT is that this is, in general, more suitable to analyze the problem of 
coalition formation within the context of negotiations, because it is more focused on 
players’ incentives to cooperate and on the procedures which lead to the formation of 
coalitions. 
5.1  Cooperative versus Noncooperative coalition theory 
As emphasized by Bloch (1997), the analysis of endogenous formation of coalitions 
poses three basic questions: (1) Which coalitions will form in equilibrium? (2) How will 
the coalitional worth be divided among coalition members? (3) How does the presence 
of other coalitions affect the incentives to cooperate? 
The cooperative approach to coalition formation mostly focuses on the second 
question, that is the division of the payoffs among co-operators, while the first question 
is generally avoided.  Most of cooperative models, indeed, are based on the idea that, 
among all the possible coalitions that could form, the one that is most valuable
12 will 
actually be produced. Therefore, there is an assumption of Pareto-optimality (i.e., the 
most efficient, value-maximizing coalition will always form) regardless of the process 
required to form such a coalition. In fact, the processes are considered unproblematic, as 
rational actors will always choose the outcome that maximizes their value. In other 
words, once the best outcome is determined based on the attributes of the actors and the 
payoffs available to them, the assumption is that the outcome will always realize. 
This is exactly the same idea of Nash/cooperative bargaining theory which 
imposes a number of axioms on the bargaining solution and, assuming that all players 
participate in the agreement, focuses on the problem of dividing the pie according to 
some criteria (such as feasibility, fairness, stability). The solution concepts adopted are 
the same: from the Core to the Shapley-value, the Nucleolus, the Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solution. 
                                                 
12 Value is not usually defined explicitly, but is assumed to have some material weight. An example might 
be the amount of policy power the winning coalition possesses.   29
The third question, dealing with competition between coalitions, is simply 
ignored in traditional cooperative coalition theory (as well as in cooperative bargaining 
theory, where competition among players is not really taken into account). The analysis 
is based, indeed, on the characteristic function that assigns to each coalition C a real 
number v(c) representing the worth of the coalition. The worth, however, is defined as 
the aggregate payoff that a coalition can secure for itself irrespective of the behavior of 
players outside the coalition. Then spillovers between coalitions are not allowed. 
Because of these limitations, cooperative games, which were prevalent in earlier 
coalition theory literature, have largely given way to Noncooperative games of coalition 
formation. The Noncooperative approach is based on the partition function that assigns 
an individual payoff to each player for each possible coalition structure. This is a 
generalization of characteristic function games that allows for considerations of 
spillovers. In particular, if the worth of a coalition C is independent of the coalitions 
formed by the other players, the two definitions coincide. If, on the other hand, the 
formation of coalitions affects all the players in the game, there is no univocal 
relationship between partition functions and characteristic functions, and a game in 
partition function form carries more information than a game in characteristic function 
form. 
In general, a Noncooperative game of coalition formation can be modeled as a 
two-stage game: in the first stage, players decide non cooperatively whether or not to 
join a coalition given the adopted burden-sharing rule; in the second stage, agents set 
their policy/decision variables by maximizing their welfare function given the decision 
taken in the first stage and the adopted burden-sharing rule. The standard assumption is 
that coalition members act as a single player maximizing the aggregate payoff to their 
coalition, but behave Noncooperatively towards outsiders. Equilibrium coalition 
structures are then determined by applying the concept of internal and external stability 
(Barrett 1994, 1997; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Hoel 1992; Hoel and Schneider 1997; 
Rubio and Ulph, 2001). Internal stability means that no coalition member has an 
incentive to leave its coalition to become a singleton, and external stability that no   30
singleton has an incentive to join a coalition, assuming that the remaining players do not 
revise their membership decision
13.  
With this simple framework Noncooperative coalition theory can capture 
players’ incentive to cooperate without the need to make assumptions on the set of 
possible outcomes, as standard bargaining theory does.  
The two-stage approach described above represents the common denominator of 
Noncooperative models of coalition formation. However, such models may differ 
substantially with respect to other important features: the order of moves, the 
membership rules, the players’ conjectures, the type of free-riding in games with 
spillovers, and so on. By changing these features of the game, the final coalition 
structure changes. 
5.2  Simultaneous (Noncooperative) games 
A first important distinction is that between simultaneous and sequential 
(Noncooperative) games of coalition formation. In simultaneous games, all players 
announce at the same time their decision to form coalitions. In such games, it appears 
that the set of Nash equilibria is often quite large, forcing researchers to use some 
refinements in order to make interesting predictions. As noticed by Bloch (1997), these 
refinements are usually of a cooperative nature; hence, the study of simultaneous games 
of coalition formation is at the frontiers between cooperative and Noncooperative game 
theory. 
The problem of simultaneous formation of coalitions has been analyzed in the 
literature under different coalition formation rules. Looking at the existing models, the 
following three membership rules can be identified: (i) Open Membership, (ii) Exclusive 
Membership, and (iii) Coalition Unanimity rules. A key difference between them lies in 
what can happen to the membership of a coalition once it is formed: Can an existing 
coalition break apart, admit new members or merge with other coalitions? 
Open membership is the rule originally adopted in the literature on cartel 
formation (D’Aspremont et al., 1983) and in the environmental literature on 
                                                 
13 Most of the existing contributions restrict coalition formation to a single coalition, allowing to group 
players into signatories and non-signatories. However, there have been some recent developments that 
admit the co-existence of multiple coalitions. These approaches invoke stability concepts that consider 
not only deviations by single players but also by subgroups of players.   31
international agreements (Hoel, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barret 1994). In 
open membership games, any player is free to join or leave a coalition. Accordingly, 
players cannot specify in advance the coalition they wish to form. Rather, they 
announce a message (for example, their willingness to participate in a coalition), and 
coalitions are formed by all players who make the same announcement. 
In exclusive membership games (Yi and Shin, 1994) or game Δ  (Hart and Kurz, 
1983), each player can join a coalition only with the consensus of the existing members, 
but she is free to leave the coalition. In this decision process, each player’s message 
consists in a list of players with whom she wants to form a coalition. Those who 
announce the same list will then form a coalition, which is not, however, necessarily 
formed by all players in the list. 
Finally, in coalition unanimity games (Yi and Shin, 1994; Chander and Tulkens, 
1997; Bloch, 1997) or game Γ (Hart and Kurz, 1983), no coalition can form without the 
unanimous consensus of its members. This implies that players are not free to either join 
the coalition or to leave it. Therefore, this membership rule introduces restrictions both 
on entry (as the exclusive membership rule) and on exit behaviors of players. In the 
decision process, players’ messages consist in a list of players as in the previous one. 
However, if a coalition is formed, it is necessarily composed of all players in the list and 
as soon as a player defects the coalition breaks up into singletons. 
Yi (1997) provides an interesting analysis of the results of simultaneous games 
of coalition formation for the different membership rules described above. In particular, 
the author considers games where the formation of coalitions creates externalities on 
non-members (which is often the case in real economic contexts) and recognizes in the 
sign of the externalities a determinant organizing principle. In general, coalition 
formation may create either positive  or  negative externalities on outside 
members/coalitions. Examples of positive externalities include output cartels in 
oligopoly and coalitions formed to provide public goods (such as environmental 
quality). Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions with complementary 
research assets and customs unions in international trade. The main results of the 
analysis can be summarized as follows: 
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R1. With negative externalities, and under some reasonable conditions on the 
partition function, the grand coalition is an equilibrium outcome under the Open 
membership rule, but typically not under Exclusive Membership and Coalition 
Unanimity.  
R2.  With  positive externalities, the grand coalition is rarely an equilibrium 
outcome for any of the membership rules mentioned above and only partial 
agreements form. The grand coalition is more likely to emerge at the equilibrium 
under Coalition Unanimity.  
 
The explanation for these results is quite intuitive. If externalities are negative, 
there is a disadvantage for players to stay outside the coalition and then it is more likely 
that full cooperation is reached. On the contrary, if externalities are positive, players 
who do not enter into the coalition may still enjoy (part of or all) the benefits from 
cooperation without paying any cost. This produces incentives to free ride that, in turn, 
prevent the formation of the grand coalition. 
 
R3. In the presence of positive externalities, not only the grand coalition rarely 
forms, but also the size of the partial agreement(s) which arise in equilibrium is 
usually very small. 
 
An important implication of these results is that standard bargaining theory may 
not be appropriate in the presence of positive externalities where the emerging equilibria 
are usually very far from full cooperation. Therefore, we can re-state that standard 
bargaining theory can be appropriately applied to negotiations among n>2 players only 
in the absence of externalities. With negative externalities, standard bargaining theory is 
not appropriate, but results are equivalent to those obtained by using Noncooperative 
game theory. With positive externalities, the only appropriate tool is Noncooperative 
coalition theory. 
The study of simultaneous games of coalition formation has, however, revealed 
a number of difficulties which is important to underline. First of all, these games do not 
usually admit a unique equilibrium outcome. The multiplicity of the equilibria imposes 
the use of more refined solution concepts in order to obtain a sharp prediction about the   33
final coalition structure. Yi and Shin (1994) and Hart and Kurz (1983), for instance, 
propose to consider cooperative refinements such as coalition-proof Nash equilibrium 
and strong Nash equilibrium. These selection mechanisms, however, are in general very 
stringent and this might generate unrealistic predictions on the final coalition structure. 
Another limit of the simultaneous approach is that it does not allow identifying the 
members of a coalition because all players have to decide at the same time whether or 
not to participate. The identity of the players may instead be relevant for the 
determination of the final equilibrium outcome. Finally, in simultaneous games, players 
cannot be ‘farsighted’ in the sense that individual deviations cannot be countered by 
subsequent moves. Consider, for example, the departure of a player from a coalition. In 
a simultaneous game, either the other coalition members remain together (in open 
membership and in the game Δ) or the coalition breaks apart (in the game Γ). But in 
both these formulations, members of the coalition which are left by the deviator are not 
allowed to react to the move of the deviator. 
5.3   Sequential (Noncooperative) games 
The problems of simultaneous games have led to the formulation of sequential games of 
coalition formation where the process is described by an explicit extensive form 
Noncooperative game. In the context of games without spillovers, sequential processes 
have been proposed by Selten (1981), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Moldovanu (1992) and 
Perry and Reny (1994), among others. In most of these games, the basic structure is an 
extension to n players of the Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model 
described in section 2. This structure was extended to games with spillovers by Bloch 
(1996) and Ray and Vohra (1996). 
All these works, although different with respect to the presence of externalities, 
are based on a common assumption, which is: once a coalition has been formed, the 
game is only played among the remaining players. The typical structure of the game is 
as follows. Players are ordered according to a fixed rule
14 and the first player starts by 
proposing the formation of a coalition C to which she belongs. Each prospective 
member responds to the proposal in the order determined by the fixed rule. If one of the   34
players rejects the proposal, she must make a counteroffer and propose a coalition C’ to 
which she belongs. If, instead, all proposed members accept, the coalition C is formed. 
All players belonging to C then withdraw from the game, and the first player in N\C 
starts making a proposal. 
However, the assumption of immediate exit usually results in inefficient 
outcomes, as shown in the following example inspired by Chatterjee et al. (1993). Let 
n=3 and the gains from cooperation be represented by a coalitional function v(C)=0 if 
C=1, v(C)=3 if C=2, and v(C)=4 when C=3. As players’ discount factor, δ, converges 
to 1, the outcome of the bargaining procedure where the grand coalition forms should 
result in equal sharing of the coalitional surplus among the symmetric players (4/3 for 
every player). But clearly, players then have an incentive to deviate forming an 
inefficient coalition of size 2, which induces a payoff of 3/2 for each coalitional 
member. If this coalition must leave the negotiation after its formation, the additional 
surplus of 1 is lost. 
In order to avoid these inefficiencies, other authors have proposed coalitional 
bargaining models where agents cannot choose to exit, but they are given the possibility 
to renegotiated over the formation of a coalition. In particular, Seidmann and Winter 
(1998) have focused on games without externalities, while Gomes (2001) has extended 
the analysis to the case of positive and negative spillovers. In these games with 
continuous renegotiations, the grand coalition is ultimately formed, as players carry on 
bargaining until all gains from cooperation are exhausted. However, delays may arise in 
the enrichment of the agreement.  
Unlike games with immediate exit, the models with continuous renegotiations do 
usually produce efficient equilibrium outcomes.  
5.4  Coalition Formation and Negotiations 
Both the approaches described in the previous sections do not explicitly address an 
important question, that is, when the members of a coalition would voluntarily choose 
to leave the negotiation table. Many real-life situations seem to suggest that this 
decision is a strategic action as much as the choice of forming coalitions. The Kyoto 
                                                                                                                                               
14 Okada (1996) proposes a model without externalities where players are randomly selected instead of  
being ordered according to a fixed rule. Montero (1999) adopts a similar structure but allowing for the   35
protocol to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, for instance, shows that countries 
often adopt this kind of strategies in the attempt to modify the final outcome of the 
negotiation. 
For the first time, these problems have been addressed in the literature in a work 
by Bloch and Gomes (2003) where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they 
propose to form coalitions in order to extract gains from cooperation; and coalitions 
participate in a repeated normal form game, where they choose endogenously when to 
leave the negotiation process. 
More precisely, the game, which is an infinite horizon N-player game, is 
characterized by two distinct phases at every period. In the first phase, or contracting 
phase, a player is chosen randomly to propose a coalition and a payment to all other 
coalition members. Prospective members respond in turn to the offer and the coalition is 
formed only if all its members agree to the contract. If a coalition is formed, the 
proposer acquires control rights over the resources of coalition members (the proposer 
player is then identified with the formed coalition). In the second phase, or action 
phase, all proposer players choose an action, which may be a permanent action (in 
which case the coalition they ‘control’ exits the game) or a temporary action. The action 
profile determines a flow payoff for all players, representing the underlying economic 
opportunities. The interplay between the contracting and action phases enables the 
authors to consider simultaneously issues of coalition formation, externalities and 
endogenous exit decisions. 
A key feature of the model is the existence of (pure) outside options for players 
involved in the negotiation process. In classical two-player bargaining games, when an 
agent chooses her outside option, negotiations end and the other player is left with a 
fixed payoff. In multilateral negotiation contexts, when a player opts out and chooses to 
enforce a permanent action, the other players continue to bargain over the formation of 
coalitions and continue to choose actions which may affect the payoff of the exiting 
player. The authors point out that there is a crucial distinction between situations where 
outside option values are independent of the action of other players (pure outside 
options) and situations where players’ outside option values are affected by the actions 
of remaining players.  
                                                                                                                                               
existence of spillovers.    36
The main result of the paper is that there always exist an efficient equilibrium 
outcome in games with pure outside options. The intuition for this result is as follows. 
Early exit normally results in an aggregate efficiency loss. In a game with pure outside 
options, players are able to capture this inefficiency loss and will never choose to leave 
before the grand coalition is formed. By staying in the game one more period, indeed, a 
player is guaranteed to obtain her outside option (which remain available because 
outside options are pure), and is able to capture the inefficiency loss by proposing to 
form the grand coalition when she is recognized to make an offer. Hence, early exit will 
never occur in equilibrium. 
The authors also provide some examples of games where the outside options are 
not pure. They show that, in such cases, the equilibrium outcomes may lead to the 
inefficient formation of partial coalitions. This result highlights the difference and the 
importance of this model with respect to the coalitional bargaining models previously 
mentioned. In a setting with externalities, for instance, Ray and Vohra (1999) showed 
that when players cannot renegotiate, the outcome of coalition formation is typically 
inefficient, as players have an incentive to leave the game before extracting the entire 
surplus. On the contrary, Gomes (2001) established that when renegotiation occurs and 
players cannot choose to exit, the outcome is always efficient. Bloch and Gomes (2003) 
identify a new type of friction – externalities on players’ endogenous outside options – 
that may lead to bargaining inefficiencies. 
 
6  Fair-division theory 
Starting from the basic Rubinstein’s alternating-offer game, almost all economic models 
of bargaining have remained faithful to the traditional assumptions about agent behavior 
underlying the economic science, that are: perfect rationality and purely selfish pursuit 
of personal interests. In other words, standard bargaining theory assumes that when 
deciding whether or not to accept an offer, each bargainer focuses exclusively on her 
own payoff and compares what she can get by accepting the proposal with what she 
could get by rejecting it and moving to next period. According to this framework, 
agents do not have any fairness concern, in the sense that they do not care about the 
distribution of payoffs or the intentions of the other bargainers.    37
Yet everyday experience indicates that fairness consideration may have a 
significant influence on people’s behavior, and that humans are inclined to retaliate 
against those who treat them unfairly. 
6.1  Experimental Evidence 
Traditional assumptions of perfectly rational and self-oriented agents do normally work 
very well in the context of ‘almost’ perfectly competitive markets, where the number of 
players is ‘very big’ and what really matters for the economic science is the 
representative agent, i.e. an imaginary agent whose every single trait of character is the 
average of that trait over all agents present in the market (see, for instance, the 
experimental work by Roth et al, 1991). On the contrary, several experimental studies 
of bargaining situations have revealed the importance of fairness considerations in 
negotiation contexts. Negotiations are indeed a very peculiar type of economic 
interactions, because in their case the assumptions of perfect competition and ‘large 
numbers’ are inappropriate. 
Most of the existing bargaining experiments examine one-period (or “ultimatum”) 
games. In such games, the Proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the respondent 
on how they should split a surplus of a fixed size. The bargaining proceeds as follows: 
the proposer offers a share s to the respondent (with a share 1-s going to herself); the 
offer can be accepted – in which case the respondent gets a payoff of x2=s, and the 
proposer gets a payoff of x1=1-s; or it can be rejected, in which case both players get a 
payoff of 0. The standard model predicts that the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium 
for this game is for the proposer to offer s=0, which is accepted by the respondent. This 
outcome is Pareto efficient, but it is clearly highly unequal. 
The data generated by ultimatum experiments with complete information indicate 
that rather than making offers where the proposers keep the entire surplus minus the 
smallest unit of account, the proposers offer distributions that are closer to an equal split 
of the surplus (see, for instance, the experimental results of Thaler (1988); Güth and 
Tietz (1990); Roth (1995), Slonim and Roth (1997), and Ochs and Roth (1989); Spegel 
et al. (1990)). 
Regularities and robust facts emerging from experimental studies of this type are: 
(i) there are virtually no offers above 0.5; (ii) most of the offers falls within the 0.4-0.5   38
interval; (iii) there are almost no offers below 0.2; (iv) low offers are usually rejected, 
with the probability of rejection being inversely related to s. 
Similar experimental results are obtained for “dictator” games and public good 
distribution games. In the former, a dictator has to decide what share s of a given 
surplus he should give to his opponent: whereas the standard model predicts that s=0, 
experimental evidence indicate that around half of the subjects choose 0<s<0.5 (see, for 
instance, Forsythe et al., 1988, and Andreoni and Miller, 1996). In public good 
contribution games, where the theoretical models predict that, because of the presence 
of externalities and free-riding opportunities, there will be an under (over) provision of 
the good (bad), experimental evidence indicates that players act cooperatively, if the 
possibility of punishing free-riders is introduced. 
These studies suggest that it is very important to incorporate fairness in bargaining 
theory because this can markedly change the predictions of the models – alternatively, 
failure to do so means that theoretical models are of little help in predicting what the 
outcome of a negotiation process will be. Several attempts have been made to explain 
the observed persistent deviations from the theoretical predictions, based on different 
assumptions over the motivational structure of players. 
6.2  Theories of fair behavior 
Recent studies have yielded two competing theories to explain these stylized facts. 
Gueth and Huck (1997), Kravitz and Gunto (1992) and Rabin (1993) distinguish 
between these two theories by noticing that the decision to make fair offers can be the 
result of two possible scenarios: (1) self-interested proposers make fair offers because 
they fear that unequal offers might be rejected, and (2) proposers make fair offers 
simply because they are motivated by fairness concerns. In the latter, normative, 
hypothesis, fair outcomes are the result of purely altruistic behavior. In the theory 
developed by Rabin (1993), for instance, fairness rests on the idea of reciprocity – 
people want to help those who help them, and hurt those who hurt them
15 – and the 
notion of equity is based on the perceived intentions of the opponent. In the expected 
utility hypothesis, “fair behaviour” emerges out of self-interest, rather than out of 
                                                 
15 Strategy which, in repeated and evolutionary games, is called tit-for-tat – or, in a stronger sense, trigger 
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altruism. Recent experiments (see, for instance, Harrison and McCabe, and Straub and 
Murnigham, 1995) seem to indicate that outcomes are more equitable than the 
theoretical models would predict not out of aversion to inequality, but rather offerers 
want to appear to be fair out of self-interest. Pillutla and Murnigham (2003) report that 
this can be attributed to the information structure of the game: in ultimatum games 
when receivers did have information on the surplus, offerers offered significantly more 
– they were therefore being strategically fair, rather than truly fair.  
Empirical evidence over inequality preferences is conflicting: there are situations 
in which the standard self-interest model is rejected (games of dictator, ultimatum, and 
public good contribution with punishment); yet, there are also situations in which 
experimental evidence supports theoretical predictions (market games and public good 
games without punishment). There are some attempts at developing theoretical models 
consistent with the observed “fair” behavior: for instance, Fehr et al (1999) show that 
this contradicting evidence can be reconciled in a unified theoretical framework if, in 
addition to selfish players, there is a fraction of players who cares about inequality. The 
question of what produces “fairer” than expected outcomes and behaviors remains, 
however, open. 
6.3  Fair Division Procedures 
Whatever the reason behind the emergence of “fair” outcomes and behaviors, it is now 
accepted that, at least under some circumstances, and at least for a fraction of the 
players, equity matters. The concept of fairness is subjective, and so is the reference 
point to which outcomes are compared, which is the result of many variables (social 
context, background, entitlements…). In addition, there is substantial experimental 
evidence indicating that nearly all subjects show aversion towards disadvantageous 
inequality, but aversion to advantageous inequality is much less prominent 
(Loewenstein et al., 1989). 
These aspects are important when modeling the negotiation process: the 
perception of fairness plays a crucial role in determining how a surplus is divided, and   40
the potential allocation rules must be perceived as “equitable” and “envy-free”
16 by all 
parties. This is especially true in a Noncooperative setting, where binding agreements 
cannot be imposed: whereas cooperative game theory can postulate abstract properties 
that an allocation scheme should have (axioms), negotiation theory needs to specify 
how,  constructively, an allocation with the desired properties can be produced, and 
which strategies players should follow to ensure this outcome. The former approach 
focuses on distributive fairness (that is, the properties of the allocation scheme between 
interdependent individuals), whereas the latter addresses also the issue of procedural or 
motivational fairness, i.e. the procedures used to arrive at that allocation scheme.
17  
According to Brams and Taylor (1995), bargaining theories have proved 
inapplicable to the settlements of real life disputes also because of their divorce from 
theories of fair division. An allocation procedure is fair to the degree that it satisfies 
certain desirable properties, and it enables each player to achieve a certain level of 
satisfaction. Desirable properties for a fair allocation procedure are: proportionality; 
envy-freeness; efficiency; equitability; and invulnerability to manipulation.  
Much of the efforts have focused on the efficiency of allocation procedures, with 
little attention to the concept of equity, and even less to the issue of minimizing envy: 
yet, in the context of Noncooperative bargaining, self-enforcement requires that the 
resulting allocation of the surplus be equitable and envy-free, if an agreement is to be 
achieved at all. In fact, envy-free divisions are rarely Pareto-efficient
18, but, if the price 
of obtaining a bigger share of the surplus is that you envy somebody else, then the 
efficient allocation may not be feasible.  
There are numerous fair division procedures, which can be classified according to 
the number of players they are applicable to; the properties they satisfy; the type of 
good/issue they are applicable to
19. Many procedures are quite involved, and may 
                                                 
16 Equitability refers to an external comparison of utilities (is my announced valuation of the goods I have 
received equal to my opponents?). Envy-freeness, on the other hand, is based on an internal comparison 
(would I be better off with my opponents’ allocation than I am with mine?). 
17 See Beersma and Dreu, 2003, p.220. 
18 Recall that Pareto efficiency requires an allocation to be such that no improvement to at least one 
player could be made, without making another player worse off. A (0,1) split may therefore be Pareto 
efficient, but it is not likely to be envy free. Whereas a (0.5,0.5) split- which could be envy-free – may not 
be Pareto efficient, depending on the initial allocation of goods and/or the distribution of preferences.  
19 For a detailed overview, see Brams and Taylor, 1996. A branch of the literature concentrates on 
proving the existence of envy-free allocations, but provides no indication on how the allocation can be 
achieved (see, for instance, Brams and Taylor (1995) and, more recently, Marteens et al. (2002) and 
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therefore be of little use in practice – but they all rest on the idea of eliminating envy by 
creating ties, which is a very powerful idea. We will therefore concentrate on those 
refinements which may lead to proportional, envy-free and efficient allocation of a 
resource. 
 
6.3.1  Basic allocation procedures 
 
Fair allocation procedures are of two main types: (A) continuous, moving knife 
procedures, in which a mediator (or referee) proposes to agents continuous partitions of 
the surplus, s, which are strictly increasing; at any point, a player can stop the referee, 
and get s – with 1-s going to the other player. If the players do not know each other 
preferences, then they will stop the referee when, in their evaluation, s = 0.5. Variants of 
the basic moving knife procedure include the one proposed by Levmore-Cook for 3 
persons; Brams and Taylor generalized trimming procedure; and Webb moving knife 
procedure. (B) Discrete, divide and choose type, in which one player (the divider) cuts 
the cake into pieces s/he values the same, and the other player (the chooser) selects one 
of the pieces. These procedures assure each player a piece of cake perceived to be at 
least 1/n of the total surplus (proportionality), no matter what the other players do; the 
cutter must play “conservatively” by dividing the surplus into exactly 1/n (according to 
his or her evaluation). Divide and choose procedures can be applied to a divisible, 
heterogeneous good and, for two players, they lead to envy-free allocations. Variants 
include Fink lone-chooser procedure; filter-and-choose; the Steinhaus-Kuhn
20 lone-
divider procedure; the Banach-Knaster last diminisher procedure; and the Selfridge-
Conway discrete procedure.  
Both the approaches share the same characteristics of producing proportional 
allocations. Unfortunately, proportional allocation algorithms are, generally, not 
efficient in the economic sense. One reason for this inefficiency is that players, when 
choosing strategies that ensure them at least proportionality, have to forgo strategies that 
would give them more – for instance, divide-and-choose requires that the dividers 
equalize portions, even though they may prefer different parts than the choosers. To 
lessen this problem, pre-play communication to discover opponents’ preferences could 
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provides a generalisation of the algorithm for any number of players.   42
be helpful. In fact, and as shall become clearer during the discussion, the procedures 
described can be applied when agents are heterogeneous: it is in fact the information 
structure which will determine the properties of the allocation, more than the preference 
structure.  
In the case of two homogenous players, proportionality is equivalent to envy-
freeness, but this result does not extend to the case of more than two players. A 
procedure which is envy-free for n>2 players needs to be such that there exists a 
strategy for each player, which guarantees him or her a piece of the surplus that s/he 
considers equal to the largest, no matter what the other players do. None of the n-person 
proportional procedures is envy-free: whilst they guarantee each player a portion which 
is at least 1/n, one or more of the players may think that another player received a larger 
piece.  
In addition to not being envy-free in the case of n>2 players, proportional fair 
allocation procedures cannot easily be employed in the case of non-divisible goods. In 
this case, the main allocation procedures is the Knaster’s sealed bids procedure, an n-
person auction scheme that is proportional and efficient, but not envy-free for n>2. 
Players submit sealed bids for items, which are then allocated to the highest offerer; in 
the second stage, there are some side-payments, with the monetary reallocation 
estimated by computing the “fair share” for each player.  
 
6.3.2  Refinements of the basic procedures  
 
Generally, there is no fair-division scheme that is simultaneously (1) algorithmic; 
(2) proportional; and (3) efficient. An exception is the Adjusted Winner procedure 
(AW) (Brams and Taylor 1996, 2000), which produces settlements that are efficient, 
envy-free and equitable with respect to bargainers’ announced preferences for n=2
21. 
However, the AW provides no incentives for player to be truthful about their 
preferences: it is once again the information structure which determines the properties 
of the solution. In this procedure, two parties begin by independently distributing a total 
of 100 points across all items to be allocated, according to their own valuation of the 
goods. Each player is then assigned the goods which s/he values most. The initial 
allocation is then adjusted to equalize the total valuations of the goods for the two   43
players
22. The allocation thus achieved is efficient – no player can be made better off 
without the other being worse off; it is equitable, in that announced valuations are 
equated; and it is envy-free – no player would trade his or her allocation for that of the 
other player. However, envy-freeness and equitability are only apparent, as they rely on 
the truthful revelation of players’ valuations – with asymmetric information, the player 
with complete information can exploit the other player and manipulate the procedure. 
An alternative envy-free allocation – which is however not efficient – is the 
Proportional Allocation (PA). As the name indicates, under this procedure players are 
allocated the same share of their valuation of the goods, hence the resulting allocation is 
envy-free. Under PA, players have the incentive to reveal near true preferences, as the 
payoffs are hardly affected by deviations
23.  
PA’s incentives to be truthful come at an efficiency cost with respect to AW: it is 
however possible to induce players to reveal their nearly-true valuation under an AW 
procedure, by imposing a PA allocation as a default, should either player be dissatisfied 
with the allocation reached under AW. 
An alternative is Raith’s Adjusted Knaster (AK) procedure (Raith, 2000), which is 
a combination of the Knaster and the AW procedures. AK combines the efficient side 
payments of the sealed bid procedure with the equitability conditions of AW, for 2 
players. By imposing an equitable monetary transfer, the AK implements an outcome 
that is at least as good as that of the AW.  
The fact that these procedures ensure efficiency, equitability and envy-freeness in 
the 2 persons case is encouraging, despite AW’s theoretical (but probably not practical 
24) vulnerability to strategic manipulation. Unfortunately, neither AW nor PA maintain 
these properties when there are n>2 players. Algorithms have been developed that find 
an allocation satisfying two of the three properties: which pair of properties constitutes 
the most desirable set is not clear a priori.  
                                                                                                                                               
21 The AW, in its basic form, implements the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (Raith 2000). 
22 The same argument applies to issues negotiated (continuous vs. discrete), where player 1 gets 60% of 
the issue means that the issue is resolved 60% in favour of player 1. 
23 In fact, it is shown in Brams and Taylor (1996), p. 77, that, in the absence of reliable information about 
the opponent’s preferences, it is a dominant strategy for each player to reveal a valuation close to his or 
her true valuation – especially in the range 20-80. For extreme values, truth revelation is a dominant 
strategy if players have symmetric or opposite valuation of the good. 
24 See Brams and Taylor (1996), p.  85.   44
When the number of players increases, the algorithms for envy-free allocation get 
very complicated. There are modifications of other procedures which generate near 
envy-free allocations, with the degree of error being within any present tolerance level 
(Brams and Taylor, 1996, p.129). For instance, the general moving knife procedure can 
be modified to allow players to re-enter the game even though they have received a 
piece of the cake, by calling cut again and again, with the provision that they must take 
the piece of cake determined by their most recent cut, and return the previous piece.  
In a generalization of the divide-and-choose procedure, players can achieve an 
envy-free allocation of part of the cake
25 through a trimming strategy: at different stages 
of the game, parties create equal shares for themselves by trimming others’ partitions of 
the surplus. Note that the final allocation will depend on the order in which players 
move – there are therefore many envy-free allocations, and many possible equilibria to 
this game. Moreover, not only does this procedure become very complicated as n 
increase, but also it is not clear what to do with the trimming and the piece left aside: 
these cannot be distributed, as in the case for n=3, in a manner that leaves players envy-
free, and exhausts the cake. If one allows for an infinite number of stages, then the 
procedure can be applied over and over again – and eventually the whole cake is 
allocated. But the corresponding finite algorithm is complex and unbounded in the sense 
that the number of cuts needed to produce a given division depends on the number of 
players and on their preferences. Within this procedure, the existence of an envy-free 
allocation rests on the assumption that the good is divisible – or, in the case of 
indivisible goods, that there are enough of more divisible goods which can be trimmed 
in lieu of the discrete good.  
Brams and Kilgour (2001) propose a fair division procedure for the allocation of 
indivisible goods and divisible bads (the price to be paid for the goods). In the Gap 
procedure, goods are assigned to players in such a way that the total sum of their bids 
for the goods is maximized (maxsum allocation); the prices paid are obtained by 
decreasing bid values to the next highest bids until their sum is equal to or less than the 
total value of the goods: once this level is reached (and provided that the sum is not 
equal to it) reductions in the next higher bids are made in proportion to the differences 
                                                 
25 This is an extension of the Selfridge-Conway discrete procedure, which allows an envy-free allocation 
of a heterogeneous good among three players with different valuation of the good in question.    45
between these bids for each good and the next lower bids. Bids therefore serve the dual 
purpose of assigning the goods to the players, and determining the prices players have 
to pay: however, unlike in the Knaster’s procedure, the highest bidders do not 
necessarily receive the goods, and the prices players pay depend not only on their own 
evaluation of the good, but also on other players’ – the more competitive the bids, the 
higher the price to pay will be. Under the Gap procedure, no players ever pays a 
negative price – the lowest price a player can pay being the lowest bid for that good; no 
player pays more than his bid – players pay either their own bid, or a lower price; the 
allocation is Pareto efficient, because it maximizes total surplus.  
However, the Gap procedure does not produce envy-free allocations – that is, a 
player may prefer the good assigned to another player, at the price that the other player 
pays for it, to the one assigned to him, at the Gap price. Potthoff (2002) proposes a 
linear programming solution to find an envy free solution which is closes to the Gap 
solution – that is, that set of envy-free prices that minimizes the sum of absolute 
difference from the Gap prices. Such a solution always exists when negative prices are 
allowed – but its existence is not guaranteed otherwise 
6.4. Synthesis of the procedures 
Whatever the underlying motivations are for the emergence of “fair” behaviors and/or 
outcomes, the perception of fairness is critical to facilitate the achievement of an 
agreement on how to divide a surplus in a Noncooperative negotiation framework, 
where allocations need to be self-enforcing. 
In  
Table 2, the main fair division procedures presented here are summarized and 
compared, with respect to three main characteristics: equity, envy-freeness, and 
efficiency. An allocation is equitable when players think that their portion is worth the 
same as everybody else’s’; it is envy-free when every player thinks s/he receives a 
portion that is at least tied for the largest, or tied for most valuable, and hence does not 
envy any other player; and it is efficient, if no player can be made better off, without 
another player being made worse off.   46
When the properties of the fair division procedures vary depending on the 
number of players (two or more than two) and/or the type of item they can be applied to 
(homogenous or heterogeneous, divisible or indivisible), this is emphasized in the table.  
 
Table 2: Summary of the main fair division procedures, and key characteristics 
 
 Players  Surplus  Equity  Envy-free  Efficient 
 
Basic Fair Division Procedures  
 
Discrete procedures  











all the parts of 
the cake 
Filer and choose  2  Non-divisible – 
public good  







all the parts of 
the cake 





Proportional Yes  No   
Lone-divider >2  Divisible 
Heterogeneous 




all the parts of 
the cake 
Lone-chooser   2 and 
>2 
Divisible  Proportional  Yes for 2 
players. 
 





all the parts of 
the cake 
Continuous procedures 
Moving knife  2  Divisible 
Heterogeneous 


















all the parts of 
the cake   47
















Yes   Adjusted winner 
>2 Divisible 
Indivisible  















>2 Indivisible  goods 
and divisible bads 
Proportional Envy-free  Yes 
 
 
The procedures described in this short review are applicable to both homogenous 
and heterogeneous players – it is in fact the structure of information which determines 
the properties of the solution. When (a)symmetry of information and players’ preference 
structure affect the properties of the solution, this is highlighted in the table. 
There are therefore numerous fair-division procedures, which exhibit different 
properties with respect to the efficiency, equitability, envy-freeness of both the 
procedures and the resulting allocation. It is difficult to answer theoretically which 
procedure is best, as trade-offs among their characteristics, as well as consideration of 
vulnerability of the procedure to strategic manipulation, need to be considered.  
However, the focus of researcher and practitioners should shift away from the 
achievement of an efficient allocation as the overriding goal, and pay more attention to 
the properties of equity and envy-freeness – which should be satisfied, if a self-
enforcing agreement is needed. In fact, restricting the possible agreements to those 
satisfying some form of equity and envy-freeness could help select one equilibrium 
when a multiplicity of equilibria could be possible. 
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7  Conclusions 
The relevance of negotiations to everyday life cannot be overemphasized. Yet, a 
comprehensive theory of negotiation is still missing: the factors involved in the 
processes of negotiations are so complex and varied, that they have been tackled in 
isolation, with the consequence that many theoretical results of the standard models do 
not always find support in empirical evidence. 
From this review of the theory four main considerations emerge, which should 
be taken into account in the formulation of a suitable negotiation model: 
  The  Noncooperative approach to negotiations is useful in that it allows for the 
analysis of players’ incentives to cooperate. Moreover, the outcome of a 
Noncooperative game has the property of being self-enforcing. This is particularly 
important at the international level where there are no supranational governing 
bodies that can impose cooperation, and agreements have to be reached voluntarily 
among sovereign states.  
  The sequential-move approach enables the process of negotiation to be modeled. 
This, in turn, allows for the analysis of some particular issues (such as bargaining 
and political power, asymmetric information, time preferences) which may have 
relevant effects on the bargaining outcome. 
  However, standard bargaining theory is not well suited to deal with bargaining 
situations where (positive) externalities are involved. The presence of externalities 
opens up the possibility of intermediate agreements, neither fully cooperative, nor 
fully Noncooperative. These more complex situations can be better explored by 
Noncooperative coalition theory. 
  Finally, both standard bargaining theory and coalition theory do not address the 
issue of fair division in a comprehensive manner, focusing almost exclusively on the 
efficiency property of the outcomes. The integration of fair division theory in 
negotiation is however crucial if the solution/agreement is to be implemented and 
sustained.    49
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